


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1973

Dear Mr. Brundage:

Thank you for your letter of June 7 enclosing a copy of the Council's recent letter and resolution stemming from the SACLANT meeting in late May. Both documents provide a thoughtful summary of current challenges and opportunities, and you have my thanks for your remarks relating to the Atlantic Charter speech.

Warm regards,



Henry A. Kissinger

The Honorable  
Percival F. Brundage  
The Atlantic Council of the U.S.  
1616 H Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20006

3371

ACTION

July 2, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER  
FROM: A. Denis Clift  
SUBJECT: Reply to Percival Brundage

Percival Brundage has sent you the letter at Tab B forwarding a recent letter and resolution issued by The Atlantic Council, following a SACLANT seminar on Allied sea power held at Norfolk in late May.

The Council's resolution welcomes your April 23 speech and calls on the Allies to undertake "a serious, sustained and realistic examination of the questions posed in this speech, in a positive and constructive manner."

The reply for your signature at Tab A would thank Percival Brundage for his letter.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

# THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL

OF THE UNITED STATES

1616 H STREET, N.W. • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

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June 7, 1973

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

You may be interested in the attached  
letter which we are sending out to our directors  
and sponsors to keep up their interest in your  
proposal for European-American relations.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

*Percival F. Brundage*  
Percival F. Brundage

*Thank you* 7. *yes* *W*

AN  
RY H. FOWLER  
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June 7, 1973

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We have just completed a meeting involving some 63 representatives of 14 nations held in cooperation with the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic -- the combined naval command -- at Norfolk.

The meeting was an eye-opener. The naval situation was reviewed carefully. Those present were convinced of its serious nature and inserted the following paragraph in the final resolution which is enclosed in full: "The adjustment of Allied sea power to the Soviet expansion on the seas is necessary to maintain deterrence against both nuclear and non-nuclear attack, and equally against pressure backed by sea power directed against maritime routes critical to the Allies in peace or in war -- the sea-lanes for petroleum or other vital supplies, for example."

We were surprised to learn of the degree of misunderstanding that existed among some Europeans on Dr. Henry Kissinger's call for a "New Atlantic Charter," a speech which was intended to clarify the United States' desire to work with its Allies in a closer and more unified manner. Instead, partly because of the difficulty of translating the word "charter" in some other languages, the idea became widespread that we were proposing a change in the North Atlantic Alliance itself.

Another unfortunate impression was the belief of some Europeans from countries not members of the Common Market that we were not interested in relations with them. They reached this mistaken idea because the emphasis of Dr. Kissinger's speech was on relations between the European Communities, the United States and Japan.

From the foregoing account of our meeting and the final resolution, I am sure you will see the increasing significance of the work of this Council in keeping channels of communications open between this country and its European Allies. In this vital task we are most appreciative of your continuing help.

Yours sincerely,

Percival F. Brundage



## ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION ASSOCIATION DU TRAITE ATLANTIQUE

185, RUE DE LA POMPE - PARIS 16 - 553. 15-08  
1616 H STREET, N.W. - WASHINGTON, D.C. - 347-9353

### RESOLUTION

Issued by the Council of the Atlantic Treaty Association  
at its Spring Meeting and Seminar, held at SACLANT Headquarters,  
Norfolk, Virginia, May 26, 1973

1. Having reviewed the state of relations among members of the North Atlantic Alliance, and particularly the relations between its European members and the United States, the Council concluded that there was danger to the fundamental political, security, and economic interests of the Allies -- and indeed, danger to the Alliance itself -- in a policy of continued drift. The rapid pace of change in world politics, and in the world economy, has resulted in divergences of outlook among the Allies, but not in divergences of interest. The security and prosperity of all the members of the Alliance are and will remain indivisible for as far ahead as can be foreseen. The divergences of outlook among the Allies can only be overcome by candid and sustained discussion in the perspective of their overriding common interests.

The Council therefore welcomed the call for such a dialogue "in an outward looking spirit" issued at the European Summit meeting of October 1972 by the heads of state of the members of the European Community, and the recent response of the United States government through Mr. Henry Kissinger's speech of April 23, 1973. The Council, after seeking some clarification about Mr. Kissinger's speech, called on the Allies to undertake a serious, sustained and realistic examination of the questions posed in this speech, in a positive and constructive manner.

2. The Allied nations, along with other concerned nations, face a number of difficult problems in the fields of security, political relations, and economics.

3. The security and political problems of the North Atlantic Alliance can be solved only through the cooperative efforts of its European and North American members, working together under the North Atlantic Treaty, and in the first instance through the North Atlantic Council. The Council of the Atlantic Treaty Association expresses its conviction that the political and security problems of the Alliance can and should be resolved, without modifying the Treaty.

4. The Council finds equally that the Allied nations face certain common economic and financial problems which can be resolved only through the friendly cooperation of the European and North American allies, Japan, and other concerned nations.

5. The consultations and negotiations essential to the resolution of these problems should be carried out insofar as possible through the the existing institutions for international cooperation. The Allies should approach these problems with full appreciation of their interrelationship, and their importance to vital security interests.

6. One important subject examined at the meetings in Norfolk and reviewed with the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic was the problem of maritime and naval security in relation to the twin objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty; deterrence of the threat or the fact of nuclear or conventional attack on the Allies; and the achievement of detente, and indeed of true peace between the Allies and the Soviet Union and its associates.

The extraordinary expansion of Soviet sea power in recent years has transformed the security problems of the Alliance, as defined by the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Council of the Atlantic Treaty Association registers its concern at this development, and its continued conviction, in accordance with its Assembly Resolution of 1969, that naval cooperation among the Allies is required outside the geographical boundaries of the Treaty area.

The adjustment of Allied sea power to the Soviet expansion on the seas is necessary to maintain deterrence against both nuclear and non-nuclear attack, and equally against pressure backed by sea power directed against maritime routes critical to the Allies in peace or in war -- the sea-lanes for petroleum or other vital supplies, for example.

7. The prospective negotiations in SALT II, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and on mutual and balanced force reductions offer possibilities for improvements in, as well as dangers to the security of the Atlantic area. They should be pursued positively with the aim of achieving real rather than merely illusory contributions to peace and security.

Allied positions in these negotiations should be taken after full Alliance consultation and with great prudence.

It should be our objective that the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe acquire a stake in a cooperative structure of peace. The relations among the states of Europe should be based on the free movement of peoples and ideas.

The security of Europe must be based on the absence of military threats to the political process. In this connection the Council wishes to emphasize that

recent increases in the Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe are incompatible with negotiation in good faith. There should be no unilateral force reductions except in connection with a satisfactory outcome of the MBFR negotiations.

8. The maintenance of deterrence, and the achievement of detente, and then of peace, continue to require the unity of the Allies in many common programs. In a period of rapid change, a fresh effort of will is needed to harmonize Allied perceptions as to the meaning of events. That will cannot develop among our governments unless it is sustained by an informed and up-to-date public opinion in all the Allied countries. The Council therefore calls on its constituent bodies to intensify their efforts, reaching out wherever possible to involve all citizens of good will in their programs.

On such a basis, we can continue to develop a community based not on fear but on hope.

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